Battle of Ideas-Ooduapathfinder--Lifting up the standard
“Most reporting on the conflict is using questionable framings, suggesting it is purely driven by a desire to plunder the region’s rich mineral resources.”
This story was originally published by The New Humanitarian. The New Humanitarian puts quality, independent journalism at the service of the millions of people affected by humanitarian crises around the world. Find out more at www.thenewhumanitarian.org.”
Assistant Professor at the University of Utrecht, specialising in dynamics of conflict and violence in eastern DRC
Co-founder of the Ebuteli Institute, and the author of Conflict Miner
The capture of North Kivu’s provincial capital, Goma, by the M23 armed group last month has multiplied international coverage of the forgotten crisis in eastern Democratic Republic of the CongoYet most reporting on the conflict is using mistaken framings, suggesting it is purely driven by a desire to plunder the region’s rich mineral resources.
The conflict minerals narrative contains several tropes: Proponents claim that the M23 and its Rwandan allies launched the insurgency to loot large quantities of minerals from neighbouring DRC; that Western electronics or tech corporations buy violently exploited minerals and thus become complicit in the conflict; and that the war is driven by competition for so-called critical minerals required by the energy transition.
There is nothing new or surprising about blaming the M23 crisis on greed for resources. Conflict minerals have been the primary lens through which international media have approached conflicts in eastern DRC for almost three decades.
This story has an intuitive appeal: It offers a clear narrative with a primary and very tangible culprit (Western multinationals), a direct link to the public (who own a laptop or mobile phone), and a neat solution: Stop buying ‘conflict minerals’ and sanction wrongdoers.
Whereas war in other settings is often acknowledged to be the product of a more complex type of geopolitics, history, and ideology, warfare in Africa is reduced to naked greed.
But as much as it is seductive, the narrative is incomplete and false. And, as we have seen throughout the past decade, it can be highly dangerous, leading to poor policies and failed peace efforts that ultimately hurt the very people affected by violence.
Ultimately, the conflict minerals narrative is grounded in a colonial worldview, where Western producers and consumers are the ultimate arbiters of suffering in eastern DRC. It is therefore deeply inscribed in White Saviourism. It does not acknowledge African agency, let alone account for a changing world where non-Western corporations have become major electronics producers.
Above all, the conflict minerals narrative reproduces a problematic kind of African exceptionalism. Whereas war in other settings is often acknowledged to be the product of a more complex type of geopolitics, history, and ideology, warfare in Africa is reduced to naked greed. Abandoning these tired tropes will be indispensable for creating a viable path towards peace.
Natural resources do play an important role for both eastern DRC and Rwanda’s political economy, and it is true that the return of the M23 in 2021 correlates with a sharp rise in Rwanda’s mineral exports, as per official statistics.
Moreover, the M23 does benefit from mineral exploitation and trade. Last year, for example, the rebels seized the Rubaya mine (one of the world’s biggest coltan deposits), and are now earning some $800,000 a month from taxation according to UN estimates.
However, the Rubaya takeover came more than two years after the insurgency started, and cannot therefore be considered its proximate trigger, nor do the mines constitute the group’s sole means of making money.
Other flagship mines in the region (including cassiterite in Bisie) remain out of the M23’s range, as do DRC’s enormous deposits of copper and cobalt – a key mineral for producing electric vehicle batteries – which are concentrated in the country’s southeast. This region is not affected by conflict but is part of multi-billion dollar supply chains characterised by large-scale international and domestic corruption.
What then drives the M23? On the one hand, there are the interests and ambitions of the M23’s leadership. These include individual interests linked to amnesty for past violence as well as wider political and military claims. Whereas the latter initially centred on political participation and refugee return for the Congolese Tutsi community (the community from which most M23 leaders hail) the rebels are now articulating a more national agenda, threatening to march to Kinshasa, the capital. It is unclear whether that threat is rhetoric or based on a genuine plan.
On the other hand, Rwanda, which the UN says has several thousand troops supporting the M23, has had a steady interest in exerting influence over eastern DRC for the past 30 years. Not unlike DRC’s other eastern neighbours, pursuing similar objectives, Rwanda’s motives for influence reflect a mixture of political, security, and economic reasons, often charged with identitarian narratives. These ambitions have inspired repeated interventions from several of DRC’s neighbours since the 1990s, including to fight enemies of their own that found refuge in eastern DRC.
Successive Congolese governments have helped to perpetuate this security predicament: Unable and unwilling to build an army capable of protecting territory and population, the Congolese security forces have become part of the long-standing violence in eastern DRC.
DRC also struggles to resolve deep-seated conflicts over identity, land, and authority that keep fuelling successive wars and insurgencies. Most armed groups and army factions involved in the violence, in turn, have developed a diverse range of revenue-generating activities, of which mineral exploitation and trade is but one in many options.
In sum, eastern DRC’s mineral trade happens very much in symbiosis with broader instability. And as much as they are affected by conflict and play a part in it, supply chains are more complex than misleading narratives around conflict minerals suggest.
Contrary to the story that the M23 has been crucial for assuring Rwanda’s access to Congolese minerals, the country has such access regardless of whether it sponsors rebellion or intervenes with its own troops. To a large extent, this is because tariffs and taxes in Rwanda are lower, enticing Congolese producers to export to Rwanda both legally and illegally. This implies they do so willingly and not necessarily at gunpoint.
Nor is coltan, which transits from M23 areas through Rwanda into global supply chains, Rwanda’s most important export product, ranking far behind tourism and gold in terms of export value. Gold brings in over 10 times as much as coltan.
While official gold exports by Rwanda multiplied in recent years, and much of that gold originates from DRC, the link with the M23 remains unclear. To date, the group has not advanced to any of the DRC’s most important gold mining areas, whose historical commercial links span across the region, including to Kampala (Uganda) and Bujumbura (Burundi). This aligns with recent research findings that eastern DRC’s gold business tends to thrive in the absence of active conflict.
Another persistent story is that Western electronics producers are the primary beneficiaries of Congolese minerals exported through Rwanda. This story focuses on coltan, which is often cited as the paradigmatic ‘conflict mineral’, and is needed to produce capacitors used in laptops and cell phones.
Yet it remains unclear how and why armed conflict would be beneficial to the electronics producers using coltan. And it is important to note that these are not exclusively Western, as several Asian countries are also key manufacturers of electronics.
These producers benefit most from a steady and stable supply of coltan to meet demand and keep prices low. They may consider armed conflict to be non-beneficial because it creates instability in mining areas, which can lead to supply shocks and therefore raise prices.
Another reason why armed conflict is not necessarily in electronics producers’ interest is conflict minerals legislation, specifically section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act in the US and the EU Conflict Minerals Law. On paper, these laws oblige Western corporations to be transparent about their supply chains and prevent buying minerals from areas where they would finance conflict. The result has been a range of traceability initiatives that have added complex administrative layers to supply chains.
Unfortunately, a decade of experimenting with these initiatives has shown that they do little to bring peace, yet have detrimental effects on those depending on mining for their livelihoods.
One reason for this is that the operational costs of these schemes are borne by local miners and traders. Notably, this is the case with the International Tin Supply Chain Initiative (iTSCi), the first and most developed traceability programme in the region.
Strikingly, iTSCi imposes higher operational costs in DRC than in Rwanda. Rather than improving supply chain oversight, iTSCi has therefore encouraged the smuggling of Congolese minerals to Rwanda, independently of the M23 rebellion.
Recent calls, meanwhile, for banning minerals from DRC and Rwanda – which electronics producer Apple already abides by, after the Congolese government launched a complaint against its European subsidiaries – could have dire consequences for the thousands of people depending on artisanal mining for their livelihoods.
The perverse effects of conflict minerals initiatives remind us that inaccurate narratives on the conflict in eastern DRC are not only an inconvenience but can further exacerbate the very problems they pretend to tackle.
By Ashenafi Endale
(Reporter Media)
July 13, 2024
All contraband roads lead to Dubai
The involvement of armed groups and foreigners in the rampant contraband gold trade in the Tigray region is escalating into armed clashes and violence. An investigation conducted by The Reporter has found that dozens of people have been killed in the region since April, including one death last week.
A number of foreigners, particularly Chinese nationals, have been detained by regional security forces for operating without a license. They are among the individuals accused of taking part in a highly organized and illicit gold rush that has involved the round-the-clock excavation of farmland and other unauthorized areas.
Illicit mining is particularly active at the Rahwa gold mine located in Indabaguna Woreda, near the Tekeze River in northwestern Tigray. Former TDF combatants, local youth, refugees, Chinese nationals, and others work at the site. The site itself and the gold mined from there, however, is under the control of senior Tigrayan military officers, according to inside sources.
The officers, whose ranks include generals, use satellite phones to communicate and coordinate activity in the area despite the prevalence of telecom network jams.
“These people have their own military and they control the mining areas. Rahwa especially seems like some place in the Congo; like the blood diamonds. It’s highly militarized because it has huge gold reserves. A lot of Chinese work there, with the Tigray generals and armed groups under them. They have plenty of equipment,” said an official from the Tigray Mining Bureau, who spoke to The Reporter on condition of anonymity.
Although it may be the largest, Rahwa is by no means the only gold mine in Tigray. Other sites, such as Hintsat, have been the setting for deadly violence over squabbles involving the lucrative business.
The official revealed that 22 people died during a violent clash in Hintsat, also in northwestern Tigray, two months ago.
“In Hintsat, former TDF combatants, IDPs, refugees, and locals work in the gold mine. Some months ago, they discovered large gold reserves using machinery. The locals asked to share the gold with the foreigners. The foreigners, largely Chinese, refused saying ‘we hired you as laborers, you cannot have shares.’ The former TDF combatants working at the mine brought out their weapons from where they hid them and then fought with the security personnel guarding the foreigners. The foreigners are protected by security forces under the generals. It is confirmed that 22 people died,” said the official.
Last week, one person died as a result of fighting at a mining site in Weri, near Weri River, according to The Reporter’s sources.
Fisseha Miresa, head of the Tigray Mining Bureau, admitted that people have died in recent violence at gold mines but refrained from disclosing an exact number of casualties.
“There were clashes over the mining sites. People have died. The fighting took place around Asgede, at a site called Hintsat. Security forces and locals managed to contain the fighting before it spread further. The largest mining clash happened in April. People died, but claims that there were 22 fatalities are false,” Fisseha told The Reporter.
The violence had done little to deter the illicit trade, which sources say is conducted through four primary smuggling routes. The first goes through Adiabo and Badme, over the Mereb River and into Asmara, Eritrea, from where the gold eventually ends up in Dubai, UAE.
Other means of smuggling gold out of the region involve using vehicles marked with the insignias of the UN and other international organizations, as well as private trucks and cars. This is the preferred method on the smuggling route from Shire to Addis Ababa via Mekelle, the regional capital.
There are also smuggling routes to Somaliland via the Afar Regional State, and cross-country into Kenya and Uganda. Much of the smuggled gold ends up in Dubai, according to reliable sources.
Shire has grown into the primary hub for contraband gold trade in Tigray on account of its proximity to many of the largest mining sites. Shire serves as a depot for the gold, and it is from here that contraband cartels smuggle it out of the country.
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (PhD) recently stated that Shire and Assosa (Benishangul-Gumuz) have become hubs for the illicit gold trade.
The proprietors of large jewelry shops in Addis Ababa also invest in illicit mining and receive the gold through smugglers, according to documents seen by The Reporter.
“The Shire gold market operates in parallel with the Dubai gold market. Most gold sites in Tigray are located near Shire. The price of gold in Dubai is typically disclosed in the afternoon. Each day, the generals and warlords who run the gold mining sites in Tigray wait until the afternoon, until gold prices in Dubai are announced, to sell the gold to the smugglers. The generals have their own network. Once they learn the daily price in Dubai, they make their transactions and dispatch the gold to smugglers who move it out of Ethiopia. The generals and smugglers have their own margins on the Dubai prices,” said the anonymous official.
Fisseha concedes that much of this is true, but refrains from disclosing further details or naming any names. He says that mining in Tigray is beset by two major problems.
“The first is there are a lot of illegal parties who have taken control of mining sites in Tigray. They hold no licenses whatsoever but control the mines and minerals, especially gold, using armed forces. This is well known. They possess machinery, including excavators, and operate night and day. The Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) has scolded the local administrations in the places where these situations are taking place,” said Fisseha.
He indirectly alluded to the identities of the people running these mines as being part of the TIA, but said the interim government is unable to force them to cease the illicit activity because of their immense influence.
“The illegal mining is being run largely by people from Tigray, and refugees and IDPs who came from various places to take part in the contraband gold trade. All areas known for their gold deposits are occupied by these forces. They have even begun excavating farmland and other unauthorized areas in search of gold, which is illegal. There have been improvements following criticism at the TIA level, but the problems are persisting at large,” said the Bureau chief.
Fisseha observes the second most pressing problem is the widespread contraband network in the region.
“Both legal and illegal miners are feeding the contraband network. The volume of gold that used to be extracted from Tigray prior to the war is still being extracted today. The same volume is going out but it isn’t going to the central bank. There are well established networks that take the gold through neighboring countries as well as into Addis Ababa. They do the job through joint networks,” he said.
Fisseha estimates that more than 20 quintals of gold is being extracted annually from Tigray, but none of it is going to the central bank and the federal government.
“The gold in Tigray is benefiting neither the people of Tigray nor the federal government. It is being used by generals and former TDF groups,” concurs the anonymous official.
The foreign individuals involved in the lucrative trade are also reportedly using dangerous chemicals to process the minerals. The list includes cyanide, mercury, and others. Cyanide is used at all mining sites operated by Chinese nationals, according to sources.
Sources who spoke to The Reporter, including woreda and zonal officials, Mining Bureau heads, investors, geologists, and regional security officials to gather the data for this article. They say the TIA is putting together a task force in a bid to get the situation under control.
The root causes
The genesis of the gold crisis in Tigray is rooted in the northern Ethiopia war, Ezana Mining Development Plc, and the feud between regional and federal mining authorities.
Most of the mining sites now under the control of the illicit trade were previously part of concessions awarded to large-scale mining companies licensed primarily at the federal level by the Ministry of Mines. However, in the wake of the two-year war, these areas were taken over by the military commanders and armed groups, local youth, and foreigners who work with them.
The TIA has been unable to stem the takeover and people who reside in and around the mines also oppose the presence of any federally-licensed mining entities in the area.
“The TIA has been negotiating with the federal government. The region does not want to supply god to the federal government until the federal government disburses the wartime Tigray budgets. The TIA has no other source to rely on, except the gold. The military generals use the gold money to maintain the TDF. Hence, they do not want to supply the gold to the central bank,” said an inside source.
Fisseha, however, argues the primary cause of Tigray’s booming illicit gold trade is the central bank’s gold purchasing rate.
“We have studied the root cause. The primary reason all miners are supplying gold to the contraband market is because the central’s bank’s purchasing price is much lower than the prices offered in the illicit market,” he said.
Although the rate can fluctuate, the contraband trade offers up to 2,000 birr more for each gram of gold than the central bank. The National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) and Governor Mamo Mihretu recently announced a 65 percent increase in gold purchase prices, but that has done little to stem the flow of contraband gold.
“We’ve repeatedly asked the NBE to make an adequate revision to the margins. Gold miners are working for profits; they will not supply to the government unless the NBE narrows the price gap between the informal and formal markets,” said Fisseha. “All of Tigray’s gold is going to the contraband trade. Only Ezana is permitted to purchase and collect gold from all over Tigray and supply it to the NBE. But Ezana is also waiting until the NBE improves the margins. The prices are discouraging. We are in talks with the NBE.”
West African Coups: Just changing masters
by Paul Martial, editor of Afriques en lute
The last French soldiers leave Niger. The crisis is so profound that French soldiers have been expelled, diplomatic missions closed, and French nationals are considered persona non grata
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Mali, then Burkina Faso, and finally Niger have experienced coups d’état and subsequently formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). These military juntas are pursuing a unified policy of international rapprochement, a shared strategy in the fight against jihadists, and a common rhetoric around the defense of national sovereignty. What should we make of this new reality for West Africa? Some see these coup leaders as new heralds of Africa’s liberation. Unfortunately, the reality is quite different.
The common thread among these three coups is that they are directed against French policy. This is not the same, for example, as the coup in Gabon, a Central African country also part of France’s sphere of influence.
The crisis is so profound that French soldiers have been expelled, diplomatic missions closed, and French nationals are considered persona non grata.
France’s unacknowledged African history
There are multiple causes of this understandable popular rejection, particularly youth. There is, of course, the history of France’s relations with African countries, marked by slavery and colonialism, aspects of which many French politicians still view positively.
France’s neocolonial policy post-independence was known as ‘Françafrique’. The former colonial power maintained its economic and financial dominance with the continued use of the CFA franc, a currency guaranteed by the French Treasury. Military domination has also persisted, with French troops stationed in Gabon, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Chad, and Djibouti. And this is without mentioning the more than sixty military interventions on the continent since independence. The intervention in Libya met with strong opposition and destabilized the Sahel region. France’s complicity in the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda remains a painful memory.
Confrontation with French policy
A French journalist published a book entitled Arrogant as a Frenchman in Africa, a phrase aptly describing how French authorities have cut themselves off from African youth. We remember the statements of a former president who declared in Dakar that “the African man has not entered history” and President Macron’s disdainful joke about his counterpart in Burkina Faso insinuating that he was leaving the room to fix the air conditioning. The unfair and humiliating visa policy also contributes to this perception.
France is seen as an Islamophobic and racist country due to its treatment of migrants and discriminatory policies toward members of the African diaspora.
The failure of French military operations in the Sahel
France’s inability to eradicate the jihadist threat in this region is a major cause of the rift. The French army intervened first in Mali with Operation Serval. This operation mistakenly considered a success, merely dispersed Islamist groups, who quickly reorganized and launched increasingly bold attacks. The French authorities then embarked on a broader operation, Barkhane, covering all Sahel countries. Despite eight years of intervention, Islamists have advanced in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, leading to widespread misunderstanding and even conspiracy theories about a supposed alliance between France and the Islamists.
The truth is, of course, quite different. French authorities failed to see that the insurgencies were grafted onto recurring problems which varied according to the territory. These included land and water competition between herders (mainly Fulani) and farmers, challenges to the rigidity of social structures by young people, or revolts by descendants of slaves and other marginalized families. Additionally, Islamist activities offer many young people remunerations through various trafficking activities. France’s response was purely security oriented. Worse, in Mali in 2017, people at the National Reconciliation Conference urged authorities to start negotiations with the belligerents. France firmly opposed this while at the same time negotiating and paying ransoms for the release of French hostages.
Coups as responses to popular mobilization
The coups occurred amid significant popular mobilizations denouncing both corrupt regimes and their inability to resolve the security crisis.
In Mali, large demonstrations preceded the coup. These were led by a coalition, the June 5 Movement – Rally of Patriotic Forces (M5-RFP), composed of parties and Islamic associations. A minority faction of the M5-RFP, led by Choguel Maïga, supported the junta.
In Burkina Faso, a revolution in 2014 toppled Blaise Compaoré’s dictatorship and the French military facilitated Compaoré’s escape from the country. This was followed by the election of President Roch Kaboré, whose poor security record facilitated the military coup.
Niger’s case is slightly different. The coup by General Tiani, head of the presidential guard, resulted from an internal struggle within the Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism, which ruled the country.
However, in all three cases, the juntas appeared as saviors and enjoyed some popular support.
The Role of Ecowas and French Criticism
The popularity of the juntas was bolstered by the policy of the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas). Under the pretext of restoring constitutional order, Ecowas imposed a harsh economic embargo that primarily affected populations already hard-hit by the COVID crisis. Ecowas even threatened military intervention against Niger while endorsing all electoral frauds. At the same time, French authorities continuously criticized the juntas publicly. Macron even refused to comply with Niger’s demand for French troops to leave, deeming the government illegitimate. The juntas took advantage of this to withdraw from the regional structure and form the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), an economic and military alliance.
Are the Juntas progressive?
The coup leaders have adopted a sovereigntist, anti-French, and anti-Western discourse that aligns perfectly with Putin’s ideology. Democracy is criticized as an externally imposed and unsuitable system for African traditions or as ineffective.
Is the promised success evident? Clearly not. The security situation is deteriorating significantly, with jihadists controlling vast territories. The recent attack on the Mansila barracks in Burkina Faso, where over a hundred soldiers perished, demonstrates the juntas’ incapacity to resist. Ironically, the detractors of France have pursued the same security-focused policy and reject any political solution to the conflict. The use of costly Wagner mercenaries has resulted in numerous massacres, such as in Moura, where over 500 civilians were killed by mercenaries and Malian soldiers. Niger has enlisted the services of a Turkish mercenary company, SADAT. In Burkina Faso, the junta has created poorly armed and trained militias, the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP), who are easy targets for Islamist groups and often target the Fulani community.
Suppression of democracy and repression
As the crisis deepens, the juntas weaken and respond by shrinking democratic space. Political activities are banned, and leaders are either arrested or exiled, as with Oumar Mariko, leader of a radical left-wing Malian organization. The press is censored, opponents are imprisoned or sent to the front lines with the VDP, as happened in Burkina Faso to lawyer Guy-Hervé Kam, co-founder of the militant civil society organization “Balai Citoyen,” and the former foreign minister, even at the age of 70. Union leaders, such as Moussa Diallo of Burkina Faso’s General Confederation of Labor, are persecuted.
Some may be deceived by the juntas’ sovereigntist or even anti-imperialist rhetoric, which merely mimics other African dictators. Accused of corruption or electoral fraud, they defend themselves by adopting anti-colonialist rhetoric to vilify their opponents.
In practice, the juntas are indistinguishable from other dictatorships: same censorship, same repression, same electoral fraud, same corruption. The only difference is their allegiance to Putin. Those tempted by the “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” policy disregard the interests of the people of those countries and fail to see that the juntas have not freed them from neocolonialism; they have merely changed masters.
ENGLAND: Kiran Stacey Political correspondent
Mon 8 Jul 2024
Every area of England should take over key powers from Westminster, Keir Starmer will say as he and Angela Rayner declare an end to the “levelling up” agenda and look to kickstart a new era of devolution.
The prime minister and his deputy will meet every regional mayor in England on Tuesday on just their fifth day in office, as the party draws up a devolution bill to be launched as part of next week’s king’s speech.
Starmer and Rayner will use the meeting to underline their desire for a new wave of deals which could see local authorities take over everything from public transport to infrastructure to skills funding.
The prime minister has promised to make economic growth his government’s first priority and believes that handing more powers to local authorities will help boost that.
Starmer said ahead of the meeting: “My fundamental belief is that those with skin in the game are the ones who know best what they need … [that’s] why I’ve made it a priority to meet with all metro mayors in my first week as prime minister.
“By resetting these crucial relationships and putting more power in the hands of local leaders, I’m determined to make sure they have the support they need to play their part in delivering economic growth in every part of the country.”
Rayner, the communities secretary, launched an attack on the previous government’s levelling up programme, as she prepared to rename her department to omit those words.
“For too long a Westminster government has tightly gripped control and held back opportunities and potential for towns, cities and villages across the UK,” she said.
“That’s meant misguided decisions devastating the lives of working people, while our elected local leaders are forced to beg for scraps at the whim of Whitehall.”
She added: “Work will now continue at pace to deliver on manifesto commitments to transfer power out of Whitehall, and into our communities, with upcoming devolution legislation to take back control.”
Starmer and his cabinet have spent much of their first few days in government fleshing out their growth plans.
Meanwhile, Starmer spent the day touring the UK – meeting national leaders in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
In Northern Ireland, the PM promised to repeal the controversial Legacy Act that offers conditional amnesty to soldiers and paramilitaries involved in the Troubles, and to “reset” relations with the Irish government.
“One of the big problems of the last 14 years, but particularly the last six to eight years, has been instability, a lot of chopping and changing,” he said. “That all ends today.”
“Keir Starmer and Angela Rayner to kickstart new era of devolution | England | The Guardian
Courtesy of Guardian News & Media Ltd”.